In Making the Social World: The Structure of
Human Civilization, John Searle challenges dualistic philosophical theories
in how they address the conceptual structure of human institutional reality.
His concerns are with the creation and maintenance of the distinctive features
of human civilization, and in particular the mode of existence of institutions
such as civil governments, families, schools, trade unions, investment firms, social
clubs, etc., which he contends is based on one formal linguistic mechanism called
a Status Function Declaration.
Given
Searle’s repeated commitment to the “basic facts” of the Darwinian theory of
Evolution (pp. 61, 65, 66, 68, 76, 84), upon which he says “our mental life depends” (p. 4), I admit that
because I don’t personally accept those “basic facts” as truth (which he self-consciously makes no attempt to offer any
epistemic justification for anyway; see p. 6), I think there
are some troubling, and even insurmountable, obstacles laid at the foundation
of his philosophy of society. Nevertheless, Searle offers an intriguingly
logical and essentially linguistic structure of human institutional
reality worth serious consideration.
Searle
theorizes that all institutional facts are derived from the collective recognition
or acceptance of declarative speech acts that assign both status’ and functions
to entities (i.e. things and persons). These speech acts are called Status Function Declarations. Searle even contends that “all of non-linguistic human institutional
reality,” such as a belief, perception, desire, and intention, is “created by
Declaration” (p. 16). These Declarations
“change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus bringing
that state of affairs into existence.” (p. 12). Searle says this reinforces his
point in earlier works that “all of institutional reality is created by
linguistic representation.” (p. 14). To explain what he meant by those Declarations,
Searle leads his audience on a lengthy trek into linguistic categories and
sub-categories until the reader is drowned in elaborate philosophical
distinctions and terminology, and left desperate for some tangible examples of
application to save them from total despair. Fortunately for those who wade
long enough, Searle offers enough interaction between his theory of linguistic
representation and common social concerns (e.g. the essence of political power
and human rights) to serve as a life-jacket around his theory. One still needs to cling to his theory in order to keep
their head above water.
Searle
begins this journey by asking such questions as, “How is it possible in a
universe consisting entirely of physical particles in fields of force that
there can be such things as consciousness, intentionality, free will, language,
society, ethics, aesthetics, and political obligations?” ... “This is,” after
all “the single overriding question in contemporary philosophy.” (p. 4). He
begins answering this question with a description of the human capacity for
consciousness:
Our capacity for consciousness and other
mental phenomena is the result of long periods of biological evolution.
Collective mental phenomena …[is] derived from the mental phenomena of
individuals. This same pattern of dependence continues higher as we see that
social institutions such as governments and corporations are dependent on and
derived from the mental phenomena and behavior of individual human beings. This
is the basic requirement of our
investigation. …We have to show how everything we say is not only consistent
with but in various ways derived from and dependent on the basic facts. [p. 4;
Italics are original]
Searle
claims that all of human language is derived from individual human consciousness
and behavior, yet he insists that the nature of reality consists as one unified
whole, not two, as Dualism contends (i.e. one part of which is physical and another
is mental). In Searle’s mind, because all human institutions are derived from collective
consciousness and behavior, there must be a single unifying mechanism between
the creation of all institutional reality from individual human consciousness. The path of Searle’s book takes us
directly en route to discovering this mechanism.
Searle journeys
further by delineating six important “notions” that relate to this singular
mechanism. These notions are essential to making sense of his investigation.
The first related notion is what Searle calls a basic Status Function. Status Functions are “the glue that holds society
together” (p. 9). Such functions are conceptually imposed on objects and
people, and their functionality
requires that there be a collectively recognized status that the object or
person has. It is “only in virtue of that status that the person or object can
perform the function in question.” (p. 7). As an example of this, a Status
Function of a person would be the function of the President of the United
States. An example regarding an object would be the function of a twenty-dollar
bill (p. 7).
The
second related notion is Collective
Intentionality. Status Functions can only work to the extent that they are
collectively recognized, and so they are “created by collective intentionality”
(p. 9). There must be a collective
acceptance or recognition of the object or person as having that status. One does not need to
approve the Status Function of a thing in order for it to be collectively
accepted or recognized (p. 8). It is only in virtue of collective recognition
that a person is the President of an institution, or a piece of paper is a
legal-tender twenty-dollar bill. Searle says that the conceptual gist of
Collective Intentionality can be compared to playing in a symphony (p. 45). All
intentionality, whether collective or individual, exists only inside
individuals’ human brains, and yet collective intentionality not only needs my
performance from intentions in my brain, but the total collective performance
of others in that symphony (institution) as well.
The third
related notion is Deontic Power,
which is a way of describing the human capacity
(and phenomena) to function as though social commitments such as rights, duties, obligations, and requirements
exist. For Searle, all Deontic Powers are created and maintained by Status
Functions (pp. 9, 24).
The fourth
related notion is Desire Independent
Reasons For Action which, in brief, is the result of recognizing the Deontic Powers of social institutions (p. 9). Once
people collectively recognize or accept the Status Function of a person or thing
(for example, that Joe Shmoe is the CEO of a corporation), certain Deontic
Powers are generated as a result (for example, obligations to not take, relocate, and use the CEO’s leather chair
without his permission). Once those Deontic Powers are recognized, they provide
individuals with reasons for acting that
are independent of their inclinations and desires. An individual may desire
to borrow the boss’s nice leather chair for a while, but once the obligation to
not take it or use it without permission is recognized, Desire Independent
Reasons for Action are generated. These reasons affect the success of all
Collective Intentionality, and therefore all Status Functions.
The fifth
related notion is Constitutive Rules.
This is important because, according to Searle, “an institution is a system of
constitutive rules …that creates the possibility of institutional facts” (p.
10). Accordingly, Searle makes a distinction between rules that regulate and rules that constitute, so as not to confuse the two
conceptually. Regulative rules have a form like “Do X” or “Do X, Y, or C.”
Constitutive rules, on the other hand, have the form “X counts as Y in context C” (p. 10). When applied within institutions
(such as the CEO of a corporation), because
Joe Shmoe satisfies certain social conditions (X), he counts as the CEO (Y) of a specific corporation (C). This means
that Constitutive Rules bring further Status
Functions into existence (p. 10), thereby providing further opportunities
for Collective Intentionality to play its part in the maintenance (or
breakdown) of an institution.
Finally,
the sixth related notion is Institutional
Fact. Institutional Facts are to be distinguished from “brute facts” (p.
10) that simply exist with or without human consent, such as the fact that the
Sun exists, whereas Institutional Facts exist only because of human agreement
or acceptance. For example, the Institutional Fact of a twenty-dollar bill does
not have intrinsic value (i.e.
purchasing power), but rather is valued according to the Collective Intentionality
of its institution.
All of
this prepares us for diving into some deeper aspects of Searle’s general theory.
According to Searle, all human (social) institutions have institutional facts,
and all institutional facts must be derived from the collective recognition or
acceptance of declarative speech acts (i.e. Declarations) that assign both
status’ and functions (i.e. Status Functions) to entities (i.e. things and
persons). Institutional Facts do not exist without this logical structure,
therefore, Institutions rise and fall, come and go, live and die according to this structure. They exist and
are maintained because “we” create and maintain them. “They” exist because
people agree or accept them based on Declarations about them, representing “them”
as existing and thus bringing “them” into existence. It is—rather shockingly, I
might add—a purely subjective existence
of something that society treats as objectively
existing. To illustrate further, consider that the sun shines every day
without Collective Intentionality being involved at all. This is because it is
a “brute fact” of reality, totally independent of human agreement or
acceptance; yet compare this with the Institutional Facts of a “twenty-dollar”
sheet of green rag cotton linen. That rectangular piece of linen is viewed by
all Americans as “money” and not a
mere sheet of rag cotton. This green “twenty-dollar” sheet is a very different
“fact.” It is an Institutional Fact. But where did that fact come from? And why
is it that a book written by John Searle is exchangeable for a “twenty-dollar”
sheet of rag cotton, but not for one on
which I hand-painted the words “twenty dollars”? That green linen sheet of rag
cotton with the words “twenty-dollars” stamped on it (or hand-painted) is not intrinsically valuable, and “we”
know this. We know this because with
the collective recognition or acceptance of declarative speech acts that assign
the Status Function “twenty dollars” to a green linen sheet of rag cotton comes
the subjective existence of “money.” These insights, I think, should have an
enormous impact on the way people recognize or accept social reality (or at
least the perceived reality of social
institutions). It should also help us rethink and revalue the role that institutions
play in maintaining social reality.
There are
many other implications of this theory as well. One other important implication
is that all human institutional reality must necessarily be the product of language. This is significant because it
means all institutional “life”—all human
interaction—depends upon language. Indeed, for Searle, language is itself the
most fundamental institution and from it all other human institutions are
created and maintained. Every day, human beings live with and according to all
sorts of institutional facts (e.g. the facts that a single “twenty-dollar bill”
can be exchanged for Searle’s book) without ever considering that they all come
into existence because people collectively agree that they exist. Only when
Collective Intentionality breaks down because the Constitutive Rules are violated
and Deontic Powers broken does an institution and it’s Institutional Facts
break down with it. Yet without language, Searle argues, even these notions are
impossible. This, I admit, is a profound insight.
Overall, I
think Searle’s concern with the creation and maintenance of societies’
distinctive linguistic features is a valid one. What is declared and what we
accept or recognize to be today
actually does shape future civilizations. When a teacher assigns homework, an
office manager fires someone, or a Pastor absolves sinners, a liturgy of
language is shaping classrooms, corporations, and congregations. However, I
think another important question—a more fundamental one—deserves to be asked
(and answered), and that is: Is human
language itself the most fundamental institutional reality? So far my comments
have neither affirmed or denied this claim of Searle’s. Yet, I am concerned
that Searle’s affirmative argument raises more questions than it helps to answer.
If all human reality is, as Searle
contends, merely the natural outgrowth of more fundamental physical, chemical,
and biological phenomena, it is impossible for there to be a pre-linguistic analogue for Declarations
(which is what leads Searle to conclude that human language is the most fundamental institutional reality). But
if human reality is the outgrowth of what God declared all things to be (Gen.
1:1-2:4), from beginning to end (Isa. 46:10), and is maintained in existence by
the infinite and eternal communication of Father, Son, and Spirit, then that God is also the pre-linguistic analogue
for all Declarations, and His language, His speech, Himself as the Word in the beginning of all creation really
is the most fundamental institutional reality. It is only because of sin that
the Triune existence and personal involvement of God is suppressed in the minds
of men (Rom. 1:18-21), and therefore does not share that most honorable Status Function
in society.
As a
Christian, I believe a Biblical worldview allows one to justify Searle’s
linguistic paradigm with more clarity and sense. Within a Biblical worldview, a
Creator-God who is the Word is
presupposed (John 1:1) and that Word has spoken all things into existence. From
these “basic facts,” divine speech acts and collective intentionality within
the Trinitarian community of Father, Son, and Spirit would be the ultimate source from which all human
language structures are derived. Indeed, the incarnation of the Son confirms
this personal solidarity of God with human institutional reality (Col. 1:15-20).
One reason why the existence of all human society presupposes language is
because the God who speaks all things into existence really does exist and all things are maintained by His Word (Matt. 4:4; 8:8; Jn. 1:1; 17:17; Rom.
9:18; Heb. 1:3; 4:12; 11:3; I Pet. 1:25; II Pet. 3:5-7). Furthermore, God’s
Word teaches that He made mankind uniquely to
image Him in the world. So, if people seriously considered the logical
structure of Searle’s general theory in connection with God’s Word, they could
see another corollary—a corollary between God creating institutional reality through speech-acts and His image
bearers naturally doing the same
thing. It is only because Searle presupposes
an evolutionary origin of all language (which he suggests has come from some
kind of prelinguistic hominid), the notion of a transcendent “Word” is never seriously
considered.
Another
aspect of Searle’s theory worth further reflection from Christians is his
notion of Deontic Powers. Searle
argues that Deontic Powers are an essential byproduct of language (p. 82), are
“conventionally encoded” within institutions, and must be publicly assumed in
order for them to exist (p. 84). In fact, he argues that all deontology is collectively created by humans and nothing more
(p. 84, c.f. p. 107). What this means
is that human rights are nothing more than an institutional status imposed upon
human beings, i.e. they are nothing more
than Status Functions. This, I believe, is another fundamental flaw of his
theory. For Searle, people must collectively accept a constitutive rule in
order for there to be such Deontic Powers (e.g. human rights and obligations).
But this presupposes what I believe is a major
mistake: that no Deontic Powers can be absolute. They can’t be absolute because no singular unifying
standard of authority exists in a world of purely physical, chemical, and
biological processes. Surely there can be real authority, not simply perceived
authority, but all social authority must be collectively intentional and must not transcend institutional reality.
Consequently, Searle reasons as though the legitimacy of all human rights changes from institution to institution,
depending on the vast power or force of the collective intentionality involved.
But again, it’s important to recognize that this is presupposed, not proven, by Searle, and therefore he cannot allow
the conceptual possibility of human rights and obligations that are not
publicly recognized or accepted. However, if the personal involvement of the
Triune God of Scripture in all human affairs is indeed a “basic fact” of life,
these issues must be approached differently. With that fact presupposed instead, all individual human beings have
rights and obligations derived from His Word which are not mere Status Functions of society. There is a personal God who declares certain things to have rights
and corresponding duties toward Him and
that which images Him. God declares the boundaries of what is morally
obligatory and permissible upon all human beings because they image Him. God declares His own unchangeable character
to be the standard for the rights, duties, and obligations He wants man to
honor and uphold so that all people can image Him properly. Of course, Searle
quickly brushes off any association between Deontic Powers and Divine will, and
the belief that people are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights” (p. 107). These beliefs in the supernatural, he says, “are almost
certainly false” (p. 107).
Ironically,
Searle repeatedly distinguishes between true and false “facts” and “beliefs”
which can be collectively recognized, and he encourages his audience to
identify with the ones that are true. Indeed his entire theory concerning
Deontic Powers necessitates this distinction in order to be persuasive. Yet in
no way, shape, or form does he account for why
anyone is morally obligated to believe in what is true, as opposed to what is
false. His theory rests on man’s capacity to recognize and accept truth in its mode of existence, and the presumption that, collectively, people ought to believe in it. That is a huge
epistemic failure on his part. In contrast, these conditions are satisfied
within a Biblical worldview.
Finally,
Searle invites critique in his view of the relationship between Deontic Powers
and political power (ch. 7). In Searle’s mind, the civil government is recognizably
the ultimate institutional structure
in most societies (p. 161), and therefore is the ultimate system of Status
Functions—the collectively intentional sovereign
institution (p. 163). Although Searle offers a variety of beneficial insights
concerning the relationship between collective belief and political power, this
portion of his thesis rests too heavily on the naturalistic presumption that all deontology is collectively created
by humans and nothing more, and that all human rights and obligations are mere
Status Functions and nothing more. So ultimately, what Searle contends for is a
theory that unifies all institutional
immorality, all political tyranny, all destructive Collective Intentionality, all
Desire Independent Reasons for unjust action, and all Institutional lies under
the rubric of natural and biological consequences. For a supernatural worldview
such as the Christian one, this is unacceptable because it rejects the possibility of God as the Sovereign Institutor of all,
thus taking away any need for His Son to save people from their sins (Col.
1:13-14) and any need for His Bride—the Church—in the world. For He declared the
Church to be an institution of salvation, health, and life that reconciles not
only all nations into Him, but social status’ as well (Gal 3:28), thus remaking the social world after His own
image.
In conclusion, I think
anyone who seriously considers the magnitude of institutional reality to be the
same as Searle considers it to be, and who is committed to depending upon the
singular mechanism underlying its creation that Searle investigates in this
book, has to be careful and considerate of Searle’s presuppositions. Searle’s
purely naturalistic presuppositions are not entirely inconsequential to his
overall theory. Nevertheless, his theory has offered an intriguing solution to
the dilemma of a dualistic conception of institutional reality worth further
development and application.
