Thursday, December 28, 2017
Slow down your thoughts, hazed and needy to escape.
Slow down your anxieties, apprehended by the motives of others.
Slow down your ambitions, carrying you off to a place of honor and glory.
Slow down your busyness, distracting you from prayer every hour.
Slow down your feet, swift to walk toward convenience.
Slow down your hands, pointing and prodding in other directions.
Slow down your eyes, zoomed in to what's wrong with the world.
Slow down your ears, tuned into scandal and hearsay.
Slow down your mouth, regurgitating popular dogma.
Slow down bothering with who's wrong and who's right.
Slow down and concern yourself only with what is true or false.
Slow down everything.
Then ask, 'Why is anyone morally obligated to believe or do what is true?'
Thursday, December 21, 2017
There is an intriguing philosophical phenomenon which has arisen within the last few centuries: the belief that when human beings (but especially theists) attempt to reason apart from sense experience, that cannot itself provide us with factual knowledge.
To illustrate such commitments, allow me to illustrate two claims made by David Smalley in his book The Baptized Atheist:
An Atheist rejects all super-natural existence and prefers to live by empiricism, the theory that knowledge can be acquired only through direct observation and experimentation rather than through metaphysics and theology.1
This makes sense on the surface of things, considering David's presuppositional commitment to naturalism, which includes the idea that no gods exist, or that if any of them do exist, he has not personally come to know them through empirical observation or testing. After all, given his admittedly limited investigation into such topics, David is aware that metaphysical statements are about some kind of "supra-sensible" reality which is not directly experienced or verified by "natural" science. But that isn't the only claim which David makes in his book about the limits of knowledge and facts. He continues elsewhere, after a few more pages of illustrations about Christian beliefs that appear to be circular, insisting that:
As I present evidence contrary to any of the above circular reasoning statements, the confirmatory bias of theists has them searching for answers of validity in the very book I am asking them to validate. Simply put, you cannot convert an Atheist to Christianity by citing the very doctrine he or she rejects. Proof must come from outside sources and be logical, reasonable, convincing, and obtained through empiricism. No religious doctrine in history has been proven as absolute; therefore none of them fit that description.2
If I am understanding David correctly, he believes that all informative or factual statements about the objective world must be derived empirically (based on experience, observation, sensation), and therefore, in order for any human being to "obtain" justified true knowledge (i.e. proof), such knowledge cannot transcend particular, physical experience or the appearance of the senses. And because metaphysical claims are not able to be brought to the critical test of sense experience, they are concluded to be illogical, unreasonable, and unconvincing (i.e. nonsense, or senseless).
This, as I see it, is an excellent example of how offensive the field of metaphysics is to the common intellectual outlooks of modern atheism. Metaphysics presumes to tell us something about the objective world which we don't directly know in ordinary experience, and which can't be verified through the methods of "natural" science. Skeptics of theism (and often, Christianity in particular) view metaphysical reasoning as conflicting with empirical science as the one and only way to acquire knowledge.
All of this, as I have said before, is perfectly reasonable given atheistic pre-commitments to the nature of reality as a whole. But I would like to point out a few important details about David's claims, and thereby the claims of any other who, like him, "prefers to live by empiricism, the theory that knowledge can be acquired only through direct observation and experimentation rather than through metaphysics and theology."
The first detail I want to point out is that such a claim about the limits of knowledge is itself a metaphysical claim. How can David know for certain that "knowledge can be acquired only through direct observation and experimentation..."? Such a dogmatic statement is not found in the objective world of sense experience, and is itself not known as the result of empirical testing and experience. Has David ever sensed that statement in the real world? It is a non-material, mental construct. Has David ever tested or observed all knowledge? Has he even tested or observed all the tests about what has been observed, and thereby known? Indeed, if it were actually true that knowledge can only be acquired through direct observation and experimentation, then--on the basis of David's own anti-metaphysical claim--no one else in the world could ever know that it were objectively true, because that statement is itself not known as the result of empirical testing and experience. It turns out that claims like David's reflect the subjective (and sometimes arrogant) bias of the one pronouncing it.
The second detail I want to point out is in the form of a question: What rational basis, or what rational evidence is there for David's commitment that all knowledge must be empirical in nature (i.e. only through direct observation and experimentation)? I find it ironic that such a dogmatic statement precludes any other type of verification or support other than empirical warrants or evidence. Such an assertion is not a conclusion supported by other reasoning. And the premise3 does not admit of empirical verification since it deals with what is universally or necessarily the case (i.e. not a historical or contingent truth). So it turns out that David holds to his dogmatic conclusion4 in a presuppositional fashion, as something which controls all inquiry, rather than being the result of inquiry. By the way, I think that's fair for him to believe. But I also think it appears capricious for all those like him with anti-metaphysical leanings to prohibit the theist from doing what is allowed for him!
That brings me to my third and final point. When David insists upon the acquiring of knowledge only through empiricism "rather than through metaphysics", that is an admittedly theoretical truth claim. And if that theoretical claim is itself true, then the uniformity of nature cannot be known to be true, in which case the whole enterprise of "natural" science would immediately be undermined. Stop and think about it for a minute. If all knowledge must be empirical in nature, then the uniformity of nature cannot be known to be true. And without the knowledge and assurance that the future will be like the past (e.g. if sugar dissolved in a cup of water today, it will continue to do and not explode in a cup of water tomorrow and the next day, and even next year) we could not draw empirical generalizations and projections at all. Scientists could not arrive at even one dependable, rationally warranted conclusion about future chemical interactions, or anything else. Pick anything: the rotation of the earth, the stability of the chair you're sitting on, or the effects of a pharmaceutical drug. Each and every premise that entered into the scientists reasoning about a particular situation at a particular time and in a particular place would need to be individually confirmed in an empirical fashion. Nothing experienced in the past could become a basis for expectations about how things might happen at present or in the future. Without certain beliefs about the nature of reality and history--beliefs which are supra-empirical and meta-physical in character--the process of empirical learning and reasoning would become impossible.
Please, please, please learn what the study of metaphysics is before buying into such strange dogmatic claims like "knowledge can be acquired only through direct observation and experimentation rather than through metaphysics." Metaphysics studies such questions or issues as the nature of existence, the sorts of things that exist, the classes of existent things, limits of possibility, the ultimate scheme of things, reality versus appearance, and the comprehensive conceptual framework used to make sense of the world as a whole, and not merely in its parts.
1. Smalley, David. Baptized Atheist (Kindle Locations 1914-1917). American Atheist Press. Kindle Edition. Emphasis in bold and italics is mine.
2. Ibid. Emphasis is mine, again.
3. That there cannot be a non-empirical source of knowledge or information about reality
4. That it's illegitimate to draw inferences from what is experienced by the senses to what must lie outside of experience--like the existence of supra-natural beings.
Sunday, December 17, 2017
At approximately 11pm on December 16th, 2017, Mike Danker (who, according to his public Facebook profile, lives in Hudson Ohio) recently made these comments about me (typos and all) on a public atheist Facebook page:
Wonder if he knows the difference between formal and informal fallaciesAlmost lost it laughing when he said circular reasoning isnt always fallacious. Its a fomal fallacy, not an informal one.He talks shit about how the modern common apologists answer these questions meanwhile his response to the problem of evil is the standard C.S. Lewis response by attacking the atheist's views on morality as a redherring instead of respondingOver and over again its like if you were to ask a theorhetical someone how they know dungeons and dragons isnt just a game and they respond by saying "if only you knew the rules on dungeons and dragons clearer youd realize its not just a game" like, the rules arent all that relevant to whether or not its a gameAlso "if you dont understand my views because theyre inadequetely explained youre strawmanning me" was annoying
Consider the following post to be my initial response to Mike, even though I doubt he will ever come across this response of mine.
First of all, there is no need to wonder, Mike. I do know the difference between formal and informal fallacies. I also know the difference between the kind of circular reasoning which is fallacious and the kind of circular reasoning which is absolutely necessary for reason itself to exist and be utilized by rational beings. That logical distinction is not one that you seem to be aware of, though. And since you aren’t aware, please allow me to illustrate what I meant at the time I made those claims (which, interestingly, neither time or opportunity was granted to me by David Smalley at the time those comments of mine, which you are criticizing, were made).
If someone—whether a theist or an atheist—claims that circular reasoning is always fallacious, and I was to ask why, the response would likely be some kind of appeal to “logic.” No matter what response occurs, as long as "logic" or "laws of logic" are being appealed to, inferred, or implied, that is the only thing needed to proceed. After all, any claim about "fallacious" reasoning presupposes the laws of logic (i.e. thought) in which the information conveyed can be considered "logical" or "illogical" at all. So when it is claimed, as Mike did, that a “fallacy” always occurs when an argument is circular, that is the same thing (logically, at least) as saying that a circular argument is always “invalid.” Let’s break this down though, because, as someone who has taught a course on critical thinking (using Copi’s Symbolic Logic) in the past, I suspect that Mike doesn’t realize that circular reasoning is involved within that very claim of his is, which means that if his claim is true (which I think is a necessary absurdity) then his claim, according to his own arbitrary definition, is itself fallacious. Of course, he wouldn't appreciate that at all, so I will attempt to free him from this embarrassing and unnecessary faux pas.
So then, on one hand, the claim is made that “circular reasoning” is always fallacious. It can only be fallacious if laws of logic (i.e. thought) exist. Once a second claim is made that he (or anyone) can identify circular reasoning in action, then the conclusion can be drawn that laws of logic (i.e. thought) exist. But that very syllogism (which is a formal fallacy, Mike) presupposes laws of logic in order to even claim that they exist and are being used. In every one of such instances where the laws of logic are appealed to, inferred, or implied for an opponent's reasoning to be "fallacious," one cannot help but reason circularly (either formally or informally).
Circular reasoning is one of those very strange fallacies to be accused of, because it’s the only fallacy which is actually valid. Valid reasoning, according to the laws of logic, is found when a conclusion follows its premise(s). Normally, fallacies are actually not valid. That is because a conclusion normally does not follow from the premise(s), thereby making such reasoning "fallacious." Yet oddly, with circular reasoning the conclusion does follow from the premise precisely because it is a restatement of the premise. Circular reasoning is only fallacious if the premises are demonstrably arbitrary. (And for the record, just saying so doesn't make it so either. It must be demonstrated, not simply dogmatically asserted, as was the case with David Smalley's response to me.) Arbitrary circular reasoning is obviously problematic because anyone who denies the conclusion would also have to deny the premise, because the conclusion is essentially the same as the premise.
As noted above with the chain of reasoning about utilizing laws of logic, the conclusion (that laws of logic must exist) must be presupposed at the outset by anyone participating in the discussion. As such, the argument is perfectly reasonable, and valid, but is subtly circular. It’s also absolutely unavoidable in this case, even though all parties involved in the discussion have tacitly presupposed they were trying to prove. We must, therefore, use laws of logic to prove anything as valid or invalid, even the existence of laws of logic.
As a side note to Mike, the argument on display above was also utilizing a variation (although the same general format) of another law of logic, in order to prove that there are laws of logic. That law is known as modus tollens, and it also happens to be one of the first laws one ever learns when studying the laws of logic. You might want to learn the basics of logic if you'd like to interact with me about circular reasoning.
Every time I find someone accused of “fallacious circular reasoning”—whether its by a theist or an atheist—I pause and reflect upon the actual argument being used, attempting to see the actual circularity involved, and to decipher whether or not the premises are arbitrary. For someone to mock me (publicly, by the way) and deflect (public) attention away from what the laws of logic actually teach us, and to simply dismiss what I said about circular reasoning as not always being fallacious (which, in Mike's case, was illustrated with laughter), is an audaciously naive response, and one I hope is recanted before infecting others with one's own arbitrary circular reasoning.
Now comes the million dollar question: Between David Smalley and I (or Mike, I guess, could also be included), which person's view of the world and the nature of reality can justify the existence of universal, unchanging, and immaterial entities such as the laws of logic?
At this point all I want to do is leave the reader to research a debate in order to begin answering such a vital question. That debate i'm referring to is known as "The Great Debate" between Dr. Greg Bahnsen and Dr. Gordon Stein. The formal title of the debate was originally called "Does God Exist?", but after listening to the audio below it will become obvious as to why it was renamed "The Great Debate." The transcript of that debate can be found here. The audio of that debate can be found here. And a brief web page about that debate can be found here. Enjoy!
What Osiris said to Atum:What does it mean that I must go to the desert of the kingdom of the dead? It has no water, it has no air, it is so deep, so dark, so endless.You will live there in peace of mind.But no sexual pleasure can be had there.I have given transfiguration instead of sexual pleasure, water and air, peace of mind instead of bread and beer.But how painful it is for me not to see your face.I will not allow you to suffer want.What is the duration of life?You will have millions of millions. Life there lasts for millions. But I will destroy everything that I have created. This earth will return to the Nun, to the deluge, as in its primal state.
Here are some thoughts to ponder. A fragment of this Egyptian story is found in two places: the Coffin Texts of the 12th Dynasty and the papyrus of Cha in Turin, 18th Dynasty. It’s final resting place (pun intended) was in the Book of the Dead, as one of its many ‘Sayings.’ But if the average person—papa Joe or granny Smith—was asked what the “meaning” of this fragment is, a wide variety of guesses could be offered. Perhaps it’s about the end of the world, with its destruction of all human life on earth. Or perhaps it’s about life after death, and the preservation of a god in the realm of the underworld. Some might even guess that it’s about existence between two worlds, between an old creation and a new creation.
All of these have elements worth serious consideration, but none on their own are entirely accurate. For those of us today who presume that this text has a surface-level “meaning” that’s obvious, let me challenge your presumptions with this fact: This text is an ancient temple text. It’s not about the end of the world. It’s not about the destruction of all human life on this globe we call “earth.” It’s not even ‘about’ existence of gods between two worlds. It was about the destruction of sacred land with it’s central sanctuary where all the gods and their worshipers dwelled at the time, and the destiny of Osiris by Atum in that soon-coming destruction. It was also an ancient lament of ‘Mankind’ about that judgement by Atum, as portrayed through the mouth of the gods they had been worshipping.
Monday, September 5, 2016
Other writers of historical works have confined themselves to the written tradition of victories in wars, of triumphs over enemies, of the exploits of generals and the valour of soldiers, men stained with blood and with countless murders for the sake of children and country and other possessions; but it is wars most peaceful, waged for the very peace of the soul, and men who therein have been valiant for truth rather than for country, and for piety rather than for their dear ones, that our record of those who order their lives according to God will inscribe on everlasting monuments: it is the struggles of the athletes of piety and their valour which braved so much, trophies won from demons, and victories against unseen adversaries, and the crowns at the end of all, that it will proclaim for everlasting remembrance.1
1. Eusebius, Historia Ecclesiastica, 5.praef.3-4; cited in Aaron P. Johnson, Eusebius: Understanding Classics (New York, NY: L.B. Taurus & Co. Ltd.; 2014) pp. 100-101
Monday, May 11, 2015
To those who are "tired of" all the culture war rhetoric, I have one last point to make. If North America were one vast pagan empire, and the apostle Paul just arrived here, what would he do first? I quite grant that he would not start by circulating petitions against the gladiatorial games. He would start with the foundations, which would be planting churches, establishing worship around the empire, and teaching Christians to live like Christians in their families and congregations. We are going to judge angels, so let's start by learning self-government. If the meek will inherit the earth, you don't start with the inheriting part--you start by learning meekness, which can only be learned through the gospel. So that's where he would start.But if one day we got to the point where there were tens of thousands of churches, and millions of Christians, and the gladiatorial games were still going on merrily, and new stadiums were being built every year, then the only possible conclusion would be that the churches in question were diseased."Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt have lost his savor, wherewith shall it be salted? It is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden under the foot of men" (Matt. 5:13).
- Douglas Wilson (from his blog, dougwils.com)
Friday, February 27, 2015
Almost every aspect of modern Christianity assumes that the faith is first and foremost a set of ideas to be believed. That's it. Sure, we encourage some marginal action on the side, but that's not truly important, not central. Our worship is primarily about explaining and singing ideas, our schools focus on transferring ideas, our evangelism spreads ideas, our apologetic tries to persuade others of ideas, community means chatting with people who share our ideas, our entry into heaven requires holding the right ideas in our heads. In centuries past, this strange obsession with ideas simply went by the name of Gnosticism--the ancient heresy that ideas and intellect are more important than bodies and people and actually doing something. We even have a safe, approved word to hide our new Gnosticism--"worldview."1
1. Douglas M. Jones, Dismissing Jesus: How We Evade The Way Of The Cross (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books; 2013), pp. 45-6
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
When the grape of the night is pressed
Nearly dry, and the trains rest
And roads are empty and the moon low,
Out of my body's breast I go,
Insecure, as a child escaped,
Animula flittering in the night unshaped;
Lacking wings; but I leap so high
It wants but a little more to fly.
Down I swoop with a seven-league stride
From church's spire to river side,
There scarce touching the ground, and then
Up to the elm-tree tops again;
Rising higher each leap and still
Sinking lower again, until
Lured to venture at least too much
I dream of flying indeed--no touch
Of earth between; then, holding breath
I poise on a perilous edge. But faith
All goes out of my soul--too late!
Air is emptiness: man has weight.
Unsupported I drop like lead
To where my body awakes in bed
Screaming-scared--and yet glad, as one
Who, after vain pretence, has done
with keeping company too great
For his lean purse and low estate.
- C.S. Lewis
Saturday, November 15, 2014
Friday, November 7, 2014
There are two things in which all men are manifestly unmistakably equal. They are not equally clever or equally muscular or equally fat, as the sages of the modern reaction perceive. But this is a spiritual certainty, that all men are tragic. And this again, is an equally sublime spiritual certainty, that all men are comic. No special and private sorrow can be so dreadful as the fact of having to die. And no freak or deformity can be so funny as the mere fact of having two legs. Every man is important if he loses his life; and every man is funny if he loses his hat, and has to run after it. And the universal test everywhere of whether a thing is popular, of the people, is whether it employs vigorously these extremes of the tragic and the comic.
- G.K. Chesterton, Charles Dickens
Saturday, September 20, 2014
Truths are like puppies. There's no point in arguing over whose truth is the best, any more than there is in quarreling about whose puppy is the cuddliest. Truths or puppies, we care about them because we find them delightful, not because we understand them. They appeal more to our sense of humor than to our sense of importance. So if there's even a grain of veritas in that vinous comparison, the most any of us can say is, "I like my truth-doggy better than yours." Anything more pretentious, and we forget that we can keep truth only as a pet. It's fun to have around, even if it wets our floors and chews up our slippers; but we really know very little about the beast. Only God knows the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. We just pat its head, pull its tail, and hope for the best. Only the Father, who holds Truth Itself in his beloved Son, actually owns it.1
1. Robert Farrar Capon, Genesis The Movie [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.; 2003], p. 297
Saturday, August 30, 2014
It is constantly assumed, especially in our Tolstoyan tendencies, that when the lion lies down with the lamb the lion becomes lamb-like. But that is brutal annexation and imperialism on the part of the lamb. That is simply the lamb absorbing the lion instead of the lion eating the lamb. The real problem is----Can the lion lie down with the lamb and still retain his royal ferocity? That is the problem the Church attempted; that is the miracle she achieved.
-- G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy
Sunday, August 24, 2014
Selfish salvation sees the gospel primarily as a means of satisfying that individual's desires and prayers. It has little to no sense that the gospel is a kingdom of self-denial or really even contains others, and it certainly doesn't "seek first the kingdom of God" (Matt 6:33). Salvation is all about me, me, me. My needs. My heart. My purpose. My prayers. My goals. My personal sins. My place in heaven. It's an exhausting and redundant autobiography. And yet, selfish salvation is the most common expression of Christian faith in our time. Thanks, Bunyan.1
1. Douglas Jones, Dismissing Jesus: How We Evade The Way Of The Cross [Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2013] p. 116
Saturday, May 24, 2014
Faith is more than simple belief because it involves commitment of a kind that is possible only between persons. I can believe that the ground beneath my feet is solid enough to build a house on and then construct one on the basis of that belief, but although I might say that I have "faith" in the ground, there is no relationship between us. For example, it would be unreasonable for me to pray to the ground in the hope that it might protect me from earthquakes. The ground does not have a mind or a will that would justify such behavior on my part, and no reciprocal relationship with it is possible. Faith in God, however, involves two-way communication, which means that there is something present both in us and in God that makes such dialogue meaningful. That something is what we call "personhood," and so it is with the personhood of God that our analysis of how we know and experience him must begin.1
1. Gerald Bray, God is Love: A Biblical and Systematic Theology [Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012] p. 106
Thursday, May 22, 2014
We have maintained that deceived people believe false propositions, and we have elaborated a basic characterization of belief. It will turn out on the analysis being developed here that self-deception actually involves two beliefs which are in conflict. This will be defended in chapter 4. What can be observed here, however, is that the conflict that exists within the self-deceiver can be adequately described as a conflict between two beliefs, and need not be portrayed as a conflict between knowledge and belief. That is, rather than saying that the self-deceiver knows one thing and believes contrary to it, it will be sufficient simply to say that the self-deceiver believes something and yet believes something contrary to it. The contrary belief in either case will be false. However, there is no need to maintain that the other belief to which it is contrary is true and held on good evidence; that is, there is no need to say that it is knowledge (a true belief held on good evidence) to which the false belief is contrary in self-deception. What the self-deceiver takes to be true (i.e., believes) need not actually be true. What is at issue is not whether the self-deceiver holds a false belief in conflict with a true one. It is equally appropriate in self-deception that the conflict be between a false belief and another false belief, for it is the conflict-state that constitutes the condition for self-deception. As long as the self-deceiver actually believes a proposition to be true, it can be objectively false and still serve to set up or generate a conflicting (and similarly false) belief. Our analysis of self-deception need not become complicated, then, with a mixture of knowledge and belief. A person can deceive himself about a belief which he holds whether or not that belief actually has good supporting reasons and turns out to be true or not. Those are extraneous matters here. The important thing is that the self-deceiver believe some proposition and then (falsely) believe something which is incompatible with it.1
1. Greg L. Bahnsen, A Conditional Resolution of the Apparent Paradox of Self-Deception (USC Doctoral Dissertation [Philosophy], June 1978), p. 147-8. Underlines for emphasis are original.
Monday, May 19, 2014
"Self deception involves an indefensible belief about one's beliefs. That is, S perpetrates a deception on himself when, because of the distressing nature of some belief held by him, he is motivated to misconstrue the relevant evidence in a matter and comes to believe that he does not hold that belief, although he does. When he holds a belief that is discomforting, the self-deciever simultaneously brings himself to believe that he does not hold it, and toward the end of maintaining that unwarranted second-order belief he presses into service distorted and strained reasoning regarded the evidence which is adverse to his desires. He not only hides from himself his disapprobated belief, but when he purposely engages in self-deception he hides the hiding of that belief as well."1
1. Greg L. Bahnsen, A Conditional Resolution of the Apparent Paradox of Self-Deception (USC Doctoral Dissertation [Philosophy], June 1978), p. 48
Saturday, May 17, 2014
SHOWING THAT THE BREAD REMAINS BREAD AFTER CONSECRATION
[INQUIRY] I pray you, now, to explain how it is that the bread remains bread after consecration, for many declare that if they had believed thus, they would never have observed the ceremony as they have done.
On a subject of this nature, we must attend to the words of Scripture, and give them absolute credence. And the words of Scripture tell us that this sacrament is the body of Christ, not that it will be, or that it is sacramentally a figure of the body of Christ. Accordingly we must, on this authority, admit, without reserve, that the bread, which is this sacrament, is veritably the body of Christ. But the simplest layman will see that it follows, that inasmuch as this bread is the body of Christ, it is therefore bread, and remains bread, and is at once both bread and the body of Christ. Again, the point may be illustrated by examples of the most palpable description. It is not necessary, but, on the contrary, repugnant to truth, that a man, when raised to the dignity of lordship or prelacy, should cease to be the same person. The man, or the same substance, would remain, in all respects, though in a certain degree elevated. So we must believe that this bread, by virtue of the sacramental words, becomes, by the consecration of the priest, veritably the body of Christ, and no more ceases to be bread, than humanity ceases, in the instance before supposed; for the nature of bread is not destroyed by this, but is exalted to a substance more honoured. Do we believe that John the Baptist, who was made by the word of Christ to be Elias, (Matt. 11) ceased to be John, or ceased to be anything which he was substantially before? In the same manner, accordingly, though the bread becometh the body of Christ, by virtue of his words, it need not cease to be bread. For it is bread substantially, after it has begun to be sacramentally the body of Christ For thus saith Christ, “This is my body,” and in consequence of these words, this must be admitted, like the assertion in the eleventh chapter of the gospel of Matthew, about the Baptist: “And if ye will receive it, this is Elias.” And Christ doth not, to avoid equivocation, contradict the Baptist, when he declares, “I am not Elias.” The one meaning that he was Elias figuratively, the other, that he was not Elias personally. And in the same manner it is merely a double meaning, and not a contradiction, in those who admit that this sacrament is not naturally the body of Christ, but that this same sacrament is Christ’s body figuratively.
Concerning the assertion made by some hardened heretics, that they would never have celebrated the ordinance had they believed this, it would, indeed, have been well for the church, and have contributed much to the honour of God, if such apostates had never consecrated their accident, for in so doing they blaspheme God in many ways, and make Him the author of falsehood. For the world God created they straightway destroy, inasmuch as they destroy what God ordained should be perpetual—primary matter—and introduce nothing new into the world, save the mendacious assertion, that it pertains to them to perform unheard of miracles, in which God himself certainly may have no share. In fact, according to their representations, they make a new world. What loss would it have been, then, if heretics, so foolish, had never celebrated an ordinance, the proper terms of which they so little understand, and who are so ignorant of the quiddity of the sacrament they observe and worship?
With regard to the points touching the truth of the belief, that this sacrament is bread, let heretics be on the watch, and summon up all their powers; for He who is called Truth, teaches us (Matt. 6) to pray that he would give us our daily, or supersubstantial bread. And according to Augustine, on this passage in our Lord’s sermon on the mount, by daily bread, Christ intends, among other happy significations, this venerable sacrament. Are we not, then, to believe, what would follow, viz. that if the sacrament for which we pray is our daily bread, then in the sacrament there must be bread? In the same manner the apostles recognised Christ with breaking of bread, as we are told in Luke 24. And Augustine, with the papal enactment, De Con. Dist. III. non omnes, tells us that this bread is this venerable sacrament. Or are we to doubt its following, that the apostles having known Christ in the breaking of this bread, therefore that seeming bread must have been bread? Our apostle, likewise, who takes his meaning from our Lord, calls this sacrament the bread which we break, as is manifest in 1 Cor. 10, and often again in the following chapter. Who then would venture to blaspheme God, by maintaining that so chosen a vessel could apply erroneous terms to the chief of the sacraments,—especially with the foreknowledge that heresies would take their rise from that very subject? It is impossible to believe that Paul would have been so careless of the church, the spouse of Christ, as so frequently to have called this sacrament bread, and not by its real name, had he known that it was not bread, but an accident without a subject; and when he was besides aware, by the gift of prophecy, of all the future heresies which men would entertain on the matter. Let these idiot heretics say, and bring sufficient reason to prove their statements, what this sacrament, which their falsehoods desecrate, really is, if not the holy bread. As was said above, Christ, who is the first Truth, saith, according to the testimonies of the four evangelists, that this bread is his body. What heretic ought not to blush, then, to deny that it is bread?
We are thus shut up, either to destroy the verity of Scripture, or to go along with the senses and the judgment of mankind, and admit that it is bread. Mice, and other creatures, are aware of this fact; for according to philosophers, they have the power of discerning what is good for them to eat. Oh, if believers in the Lord will look on, and see. Antichrist and his accomplices so strong as to have power to condemn and persecute even unto death, those sons of the church who thus yield their belief to the Gospel, yet certain I am, that though the truth of the Gospel may for a time be cast down in the streets, and be kept under in a measure by the threats of Antichrist, yet extinguished it cannot be, since he who is the Truth has said, that “heaven and earth shall pass away, but that his words shall not pass away!” Let the believer, then, rouse himself, and demand strictly from our heretics, what the nature of this venerable sacrament is, if it be not bread; since the language of the Gospel, the evidence of our senses, and arguments that have in their favour every probability, say, that so it is. For I am certain, that even heathens, who make their own gods, are perfectly aware of what they are in their own proper nature, though they pretend that a portion of divinity is bestowed upon them supernaturally by the highest God of all. The believer, therefore, hesitates not to affirm, that these heretics are more ignorant, not only than mice and other animals, but than pagans themselves; while on the other hand, our aforementioned conclusion, that this venerable sacrament is, in its own nature, veritable bread, and sacramentally Christ’s body, is shown to be the true one.
 De Wycliffe, J. (1845). Tracts and Treatises of John de Wycliffe. (R. Vaughan, Ed.) (pp. 138–141). London: Blackburn and Pardon.