Greg Bahnsen: More differences between the Priest and King

The separation of church (cult) from state in Israel can be seen by a number of differences between the priest and the king. The officials of the king included cherethites and pelethites (2 Sam. 15:18; 20:7), commander of the army, commander of the body guard, recorder, scribe (2 Sam. 8:16-18; 20:23-26; 1 Chron. 27:32-34; 1 Kings 4:1-6), counselors (1 Chron. 18:17; 1 Kings 12:6; 2 Kings 25:19; Jer. 52:25), overseer of public works (1 Kings 5:16), royal treasurer (1 Chron. 27:25-31), official tax collectors (1 Kings 4:7-19), and marshall of the court (1 Kings 4:5). Mettinger lists the major officials in Solomon’s court as: royal secretary, royal herald, friend of the king, house-minister, chief of the district prefects, and superintendent of the forced levy.17 These officers are clearly distinct from the officials of the temple priesthood,18 which were: high priest, suffragan priest, chief treasurer, overseer, gate-keepers, under-treasurers (these preceding being the council of the temple), heads of each course, heads of families of each course, and finally overseers of gates, guards, lots, and so forth.19 Therefore, the officials of the church did not overlap with the officials of the state but differed in each realm.  

So also did the duties and regulations differ between the ecclesiastical and executive realms of the Israelite state. The king tended to administration, justice, war, safety, foreign affairs, and commerce, while the priests were busy with consecration, the holy place and courts, ceremonial cleanness, sacrifices, cultic observances, and the like. Nowhere are the priests given rights like those of the king: to take a general levy and appoint officers thereunto (1 Sam. 8:11-17; 14:50; 2 Sam. 8:16; 20:23; 1 Kings 4:4), to take over property or oversee estates (1 Kings 4:6; 21:15; 2 Sam. 8), to lay levies on property owners and to tax agriculture and animal husbandry (2 Kings 15:20; 1 Sam. 8:15, 17; 1 Kings 4:5, 7; 5:2 ff.), to constitute the highest court of legal appeal (2 Sam. 8:16; 14:2 ff.; 15:2 ff.; 20:24; 1 Kings 4:3), to require forced labor or use conscription (2 Sam. 20:24; 1 Kings 4:6; 5:27 ff.; 9:21-22). However, the king was very certainly limited in his activities by the law of God (cf. Deut. 17:14-20). Consequently he could not carry out the functions of a priest. When the king takes it upon himself to ordain priests, they are idolatrous priests that need to be put down (cf. 2 Kings 23:5). When the king presumes to offer sacrifice to God he is condemned. Saul offers sacrifice against the command of God and thus must suffer the termination of his kingdom (1 Sam. 13:9-15). Uzziah trespassed the Lord’s commandment and offered incense upon the altar, and for this he was struck with leprosy (2 Chron. 26:16-21). When Jeroboam offers sacrifice at the new altar he is judged by God and stricken (1 Kings 12:32-13:5). And when Ahaz offers sacrifice upon the altar, it is the new altar made after the pattern of an altar in Damascus—the altar to a pagan god (2 Kings 16:12 ff.). The only places where a king is said to offer sacrifice and the passage does not either have a causative sense (“had sacrifices offered”) or disapprobate the behavior are: David’s sacrifice at the coming of the ark to Jerusalem and Solomon’s sacrifice at the dedication of the temple. Both of these instances are laden with strong typological value, pointing to the work of the Messianic Priest-King, Jesus Christ, who is God come to His people to dwell among them (the symbol of the temple). Thus, these two incidents must be viewed as “positive” law or activity again; they quite clearly do not sanction the priestly activity of the king as a general or standing rule (witness Saul and Uzziah). Indeed, what gives these incidents their noteworthy and special nature is precisely the extraordinary character of the events.  

Therefore, it is proper to see a normal distinction between the duties and rights of the king and those of the priest, which in turn points to the separation of church and state. While the priest had to satisfy purity requirements, among which entailed no touching of dead bodies or drinking wine, the king was allowed both to engage in war and drink alcoholic beverage. The priest had to be a Levite, the king did not; in the Southern Kingdom he had to be from Judah. 

The succession of high priests always passed from father to son (cf. Neh. 12:10-11), but the succession of kingship did not automatically go to the son. Sometimes it went outside the royal line by popular choice (cf. 1 Maccabees 9:30-31; 13:8-9) or by usurpation (Judg. 9) or to a queen (2 Kings 11:1-3; 2 Chron. 22:12). The will of the people or human arrangements were foundational to the selection or election of a king (1 Sam. 11:14-15; 2 Sam. 2:4, 8-9; 5:3; 1 Kings 1:11 ff.; 12:1, 20; 2 Kings 11:12; 21:24; 23:30). David made a mutual obligation covenant between himself and the tribes who chose him as king, based on negotiations with the elders. The elders laid down legal conditions for the king (1 Kings 12:3 ff.), and a new king would be elected when there was dissatisfaction with the present ruler (1 Kings 12:16-20). Thus although Israel’s rulership was always subject to the will of God as spoken by the prophet (cf. 1 Sam. 9:26-10:1; 2 Sam. 7:8-17; 1 Kings 11:29 ff.; 16:1; 2 Kings 9:1 ff.), it was nevertheless true that there was reality in the political movements of the people or elders in establishing what is basically a constitutional monarchy in Israel. While the priesthood was based upon strict family descent, the heads of the tribes (Deut. 1:13), some of the judges (e.g., Judg. 11:4-11), and a significant number of the kings in Israel were elected or representatively selected by the people. As Martin Noth aptly puts it, the Israelites were “king-makers.” However, the people never had the prerogative to be “priest-makers”!   

The king’s palace was differentiated from the temple (and priestly residence; cf. 1 Kings 6-7). The draftee servants of the king were separate from the temple servants (cf. 1 Sam. 8:11-17; 1 Kings 5:13; Ex. 28- 29; Num. 3:28, 32; 8:18). The Levites were exempt from the census and draft (Num. 1:48-49). And at the most practical level, the temple tax and tithes were distinct from the tributes paid to the king. While the priests were supported by the voluntary contributions of the people, the magistrate could lay taxes upon the population and enforce them. First Kings 14:26 clearly indicates a distinguishing between state revenues and religious revenues. The Older Testament recognizes an offering on the firstborn (Ex. 12:17 ff.; 13:13; 15:19 ff.; Num. 18:15 ff.; Lev. 28:26), an offering of first-fruits (Ex. 23:19; Num. 18:9, 12 ff.; Deut. 26:2 ff.; 18:4), a tithe (Lev. 27:30-33; Num. 17:21-24; Deut. 12:6 ff.; 14:22-27; 26:13 ff.), atonement money (Ex. 30:11-16), and a temple tax (Ex. 38:25 ff.; 2 Chron. 24:6-11; Neh. 10:33). All of these went to the priests and are distinct from the king’s own taxation tithe (1 Sam. 8:14-17), import tax (1 Kings 10:15), vassel tributes (2 Sam. 8:2, 6; 1 Kings 5:1), gifts (1 Kings 10:2, 10, 24-25; 2 Kings 5:5; 20:12; 1 Sam. 10:27; 16:20; 2 Sam. 8:10), taxes levied on the people (2 Kings 15:19-20; 23:33-35; 2 Chron. 17:5; Amos 5:11; 1 Sam. 8:15, 17), and appropriations (Amos 7:1). Were there no separation of church and state, all collections from the populace would go into one coffer and be allocated by a single administrator, but this is not what we find in the Older Testament. When Israel was under foreign control at the time of Artaxerxes there was still a distinction drawn between church and state, for while tax was paid to the king (Neh. 5:4, 14-15) he recognized Levite-priestly exemptions (Ezra 7:24).

Another separation of church from state had to be observed with respect to the penalties imposed for violations of God’s law. While the magistrate had the power of the sword to execute appropriate criminals, the most extreme punishment imposed for the breaking of ecclesiastical law (i.e., ceremonial commandments) was excommunication.20 This did not belong in any sense to the civil arm to inflict.  

Was there a separation of church and state in Israel then? It appears that evidence supports an affirmative answer. 

The true view is that church and state were in equilibrio, and the Lord was the head of both. He was the civil head of the republic, and was also the head of the ecclesiastical system or hierarchy. These both had access to him by prophet and oracle, and found their only unity in him. Under his administration neither state nor church could dominate the other. . . . Two features are obvious. Neither church nor state derived its rights and franchises from the other, nor over the other. Neither could fill official positions in the other, or usurp the functions of the other . . . each had its own revenues.21  

There was also a recognized distinction between the personnel who comprised the national state and those in the spiritual church. This is evidenced by the doctrine of the remnant in the Older Testament (cf. Lev. 26:40-44; Isa. 1:9; 6:3; 8:16-20; 10:20 ff.; 14:21-27; 28:5; 37:30-32; 41:8-9; 42:18-43:13; 44:15; Jer. 3:12, 14; Ezek. 11:14 ff.; 33:24; 37:12; 36:26-27; Hos. 1:9-10; 2:23; 5:15-6:3; Amos 3:12; 4:11; Zeph. 3:9-13; Hag. 1:12; Zech. 8:6, 11-15). A person could have civic membership and rights (as well as social responsibilities) in the national state without being accounted as a good covenant-keeping child of God; the mention of the remnant draws a line between those who were in the state and church and those who were in the state only. As Paul explains it, “they are not all Israel which are of Israel,” and only a remnant of those who are numbered as the sand will be saved (Rom. 9:6, 27). So we conclude that there was a distinction drawn between the personnel as well as the officials of the state and church. As to the officials, there was an obvious separation between church and state regarding qualification, function, locale, support, organization, and servants.


All footnotes to Greg Bahnsen’s work cited above are found on pp. 395-400 of Theonomy in Christian Ethics [Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Press, 2002; first edition 1977]. The footnotes are cited below as found in his book.

17. Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, Solomonic State Officials: A Study of the Civil Government Officials of the Israelite Monarchy, Coniectanea Biblica: Old Testament Series, No. 5 (Lund, Sweden: CWK Gleerups Förlag, 1971).

18. The listing of the priests in 1 Kings 4:4 does not indicate that they were princes in the royal family, but simply among the chief officials in relation to the people. Mettinger does not treat them as state officers at all.

19. Merril F. Unger, “Hebrew Priesthood,” Unger’s Bible Dictionary, 3rd. ed. rev. (Chicago: Moody Press, 1961), p. 884.

20. Shearer, op. cit., pp. 146-147.

21. Ibid., p. 96.

Greg Bahnsen: Separation of Church & State

Brief consideration must now be given here to the relation of church and state as it bears upon the question of the magistrate’s responsibility in the current age to obey and enforce the law of God. This matter comes up in conjunction with two ways in which the magistrate’s moral obligation to God’s law is either questioned or denied. On the one hand, some will hold that the magistrate cannot be ethically bound to God’s law because that would break down the standing distinction between church and state; on the other hand, appeal to the alleged union of church and state in the Older Testament is often thought to be a factor sufficient to deny the magistrate’s current obligation to God’s law.

However, the Older Testament indicates a standing separation of church and state, and this fact should be recognized. There was a distinction between the work of Moses and that of Aaron (cf. Ex. 16:33-34; 29:1 ff.), for Aaron represented the people in distinctly cultic matters while Moses rendered general, civil leadership for them (functioning a king over the gathered heads of the tribes, Deut. 33:5). So also in restored Jerusalem there was clearly a distinction between Nehemiah the “governor” and Ezra the “scribe”; it is specifically because the civil governor could not regulate the religious life of the people that Nehemiah called for Ezra to return to Jerusalem.1 At the time of the Exodus the people were divided into tribes having one prince each and heads over the families (cf. Deut. 29:10);2 the princes were civil governors and military leaders (cf. Num. 1:1-16; 2:3-29; 7:2; 10:14-27; 13:3; 17:6; Josh. 9:15; 22:14; 23:2; 24:1), and the heads of the families under them were captains and then judges or officers (Num. 1).3 During the time of the Judges executive and judicial power stayed in the hands of the family and tribal heads (e.g., Judges 11:6 ff.; the elders’ transactions with Samuel);4 each city had a council of elders (Deut. 21:6; 25:8; Judges 8:6, 8, 14; Ezra 10:4) who worked separately but sometimes joined efforts (Judg. 1; 4:10; 6:35; 11).5 They were thus governed by the judges (1 Chron. 17:10; e.g., 1 Sam. 8:1) for 450 years until the last judge, Samuel (cf. Acts 13:20). Local affairs were in the hands of the elders who settled town disputes.6 With the institution of kingship the kings served as judges (1 Sam. 8:5; 1 Kings 3:16-28; 1 Chron. 18:14; cf. 2 Sam. 15:1-6) in addition to the other judges (Ex. 18:14-26; 2 Chron. 19:5, 8; Ezra 7:25). In fact, the kings do not seem to have had legislative power,7 but they were essentially judges or governors (the two being virtually synonymous: 2 Kings 15:15; 2 Sam. 15:41; 1 Kings 7:7; e.g., 2 Sam. 12:6; 14:4-11; 1 Kings 3:16-28; 2 Kings 8:3). Under Saul there was “no central government and the tribes, or rather the clans, retained their administrative autonomy.”8 Thus while cultic duties were assigned to the priests (Ex. 28-29), judicial-executive power resided in tribal heads (cf. 1 Sam. 8:4 ff.; 10:20 ff.; 2 Sam. 3:17 ff.; 5:1 ff.) who were later seriously consulted by kings (e.g., 1 Kings 8:1; 20:7; 2 Kings 23:1) and exercised influence over them (e.g., 1 Kings 12). Internal administration and guidance of the cities or tribes remained vested in the hands of the elders even after the exile (Jer. 20:1; Ezek. 14:1-5; 20:1). Now in these matters (i.e., pervasively the function of civil judgment) legislation originally came from Moses and not through priests; when it was adjudicated, the elders and judges are prominent. Therefore, the priests seem to be completely taken up with religious service and not leaders in the political order.

All footnotes to Greg Bahnsen’s work cited above are found on pp. 389-391 of Theonomy in Christian Ethics [Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Press, 2002; first edition 1977]. The footnotes are cited below as found in his book.

1. F. F. Bruce, Israel and the Nations: From the Exodus to the Fall of the Second Temple (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1963), p. 107.

2. E. W. Hengstenberg, History of the Kingdom of God Under the Old Testament, Vol. I (Cherry Hill, NJ: Mack Publishing Co., 1871 [reprinted 1972]), p. 235.

3. J. B. Shearer, Hebrew Institutions, Social and Civil (Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1910), p. 81.

4. Hengstenberg, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 67.

5. Shearer, loc. cit.

6. Roland De Vaux, Ancient Israel, Vol. I (Social Institutions), tran. Darton, Longman, and Todd, Ltd. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), pp. 93, 138, 152-153.

7. Ibid., pp. 150-151.

8. Ibid., p. 95.

Mosaic Polity: Separation of Church and State

There was a clear separation of "church" and "state" in the Mosaic covenant. Only the family of Aaron could serve as priests in the Tabernacle, and only the tribe of Levi could assist them. This meant that no officer of the state could be an officer of the church, and separated the two institutions definitively (cf. 2 Chronicles 26: 16-19). The law distinguished between civil punishments on the one hand, and ecclesiastical ones, such as "cutting off from the people," or excommunication, on the other.1 

Some have argued that "cutting off" is the same as execution, but this is impossible. Leviticus 18:29 states that all the abominations of Leviticus 18 are punished by "cutting off," but in Leviticus 20, these same crimes are discussed, with a variety of punishments. Only a few are capital offenses. Clearly then, "cutting off" does not mean execution. ...["Cutting off"] implies that God will deal with the sinner --God will cut him off-- but since the officers of the Church know that God has set His face against that person, excommunication [i.e. "cutting off"] must be the church's response. Thus, "cutting off" implies ecclesiastical censure.2 

1.  James B. Jordan, Through New Eyes: Developing a Biblical View of the World [Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers; 1999] p. 202
2.  Ibid. fn. 7

John Calvin & Isaiah 64:6 -- "All our righteousness is as filthy rags"

www.Zazzle.com

Commenting on Isaiah 64:6, John Calvin writes:

Some commentators torture this passage, by alleging that the Prophet, when he speak of the pollutions of sins, describes the Jews without exception, though there still remained some of them who were sincere worshippers of God. But there are no good grounds for this; for the Prophet does not speak of individuals but of the whole body, which, being trodden under foot by all men, and subjected to the utmost indignity, he compares to a filthy garment.

There are some who frequently quote this passage, in order to probe that so far are our works from having any merit in them, that they are rotten and loathsome in the sight of God. But this appears to me to be at variance with the Prophet's meaning, who does not speak of the whole human race, but describes the complaint of those who having been led into captivity, experienced the wrath of the Lord against them, and therefore acknowledged that they and their righteousness were like a filthy garment.1

To understand better what Calvin is describing, Isaiah 64:6 (ESV) reads as follows:

We have all become like one who is unclean, and all our righteous deeds are like a polluted garment. We all fade like a leaf, and our iniquities, like wind, take us away.

Commenting further on God's acceptance of man's works, Calvin writes:

The Lord having rescued man from the pit of perdition, has through the grace of adoption set him apart for his own. Thereupon, because he has begotten him anew and conformed him to a new life, he now embraces him as a new creature endowed with the gifts of the Spirit. This is that "acceptance" which Peter mentions2 whereby believers are, after their call, approved of God also in respect of works. For the Lord cannot fail to love and embrace the good things that he works in them through his Spirit. But we must always remember that God "accepts" believers by reason of works only because he is their source, and graciously, by way of adding to his liberality, deigns also to show "acceptance" toward the good works he has himself bestowed.3

1.  Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin's role in the development of covenant theology [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic; 2001] p. 185
2.  Acts 10:34
3.  Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin's role in the development of covenant theology [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic; 2001] p. 186

What Catholics, Calvinists, and Lutherans once had in common

On April 27th, 1541, the Diet of Regensburg began. This Diet (i.e. legislative assembly) was an attempt to restore unity between the divided churches,  generally recognized today as Lutherans, Roman Catholics, and Calvinists. The representatives at this Diet are particularly noteworthy, especially considering that they volunteered their efforts to publicly unify, to the best of their academic abilities, with the Roman Catholic Church. Philip Melanchthon represented the Lutherans, Cardinal Contarini and John Eck both represented the Roman Catholics, while Martin Bucer and John Calvin represented the more general "Reformed" crowd. 

From this meeting arose a fascinating letter which post-reformation theologians have aptly dubbed The Regensburg Book. This book was divided into 23 articles, all of which together expressed a unified confession among the parties represented. In other words, the language of the book was such that the Lutherans, Calvinists, and Roman Catholics were all generally represented as agreeing with each other on cardinal doctrines; but even more importantly, the specific doctrinal views of Melanchthon, Calvin, Bucer, and two reputable Roman Catholic authorities agreed, as Calvin said, on "the substance of the true doctrine" of the Christian faith.

This was quite an accomplishment among the heated debates of the Protestant Reformation, and in a letter to William Farel on May 11th, 1541, John Calvin expressed the joy which this agreement brought to everyone assembled. Calvin wrote:

The debate in controversy was more keen upon the doctrine of justification. At length a formula was drawn up, which, on receiving certain corrections, was accepted on both sides. You will be astonished, I am sure, that our opponents have yielded so much, when you read the extracted copy, as it stood when the last correction was made upon it, which you will find enclosed in this letter. Our friends have thus retained also the substance of the true doctrine, so that nothing can be comprehended within it which is not to be found in our writings. You will desire, I know, a more distinct explication and statement of the doctrine, and, in that respect, you shall find me in complete agreement with yourself. However, if you consider with what kind of men we have to agree upon this doctrine, you will acknowledge that much has been accomplished.1

Regarding the doctrine of justification which Calvin noted as being vital to their joint confession, a portion from that section, translated into English, has been provided by Dr. Peter Lillback, adjunct professor of historical theology at Westminster Theological Seminary. That section can be seen below; and as many calvinists who read this will probably notice, the lack of tension between law & gospel, and imputed & subordinate-inherent righteousness is striking. I suspect that the majority of American "Calvinists" or "Reformed" Christians today would not agree with this confession:

Therefore that living faith which apprehends mercy in Christ and believes the righteousness which is in Christ has been graciously imputed to him, and which simultaneously receives the promise of the Holy Spirit and love. So then, that faith is justifying faith which is efficacious by love....

Moreover, although he who is justified also receives and has through Christ inherent righteousness, as the Apostle says, you are washed, you are sanctified, you are justified, etc., wherefore the holy fathers used the word "to be justified" for receiving an inherent righteousness. Nevertheless, the believing mind does not rest upon this righteousness, but upon the righteousness of Christ alone given to us, without which there neither is nor can be any righteousness. And so we are justified by faith in Christ, or we are accounted righteous, that is, accepted through the merits of Himself, not on account of our worth or works. And we are called righteous because of inherent righteousness, because we do those things which are righteous, according to that passage in John: he who does righteousness is righteous.

And although the fear of God, repentance and humility, and other virtues must always increase in the regenerated, since renovation is imperfect and great infirmities cleave to them, nevertheless it ought to be taught, that those who truly repent may always be sure by a most certain faith, they are pleasing to God on account of Christ the Mediator, because Christ is the Propitiator, High Priest, and Advocate for us, Whom the Father gave to us, and all good things with Him....

Moreover, he who says we are justified by faith alone must at the same time teach the doctrine of repentance, of fear of God, of the judgment of God, of good works, in order that the whole sum of preaching might stand firm as Christ says, "...preaching repentance and remission of sins in My name," and that, lest this form of speaking be understood otherwise than it has been preached.2

Needless to say, Martin Luther, who was not present at this Diet, was not pleased with this joint confession, and so he spoke out against it. As a result of his scathing reaction, no further progress and unity was formed among the Reformed-Calvinists and the Roman Catholics.

1.  Peter Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin's Role in the development of Covenantal Theology [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic; 2001], pp. 190-191. Italics mine.

2.  Ibid. 

Greg Bahnsen & John Locke's Political Philosophy

Toward the beginning of his lengthy lectures on British Empiricism, Dr. Greg Bahnsen expresses some crucial philosophical distinctions about political philosophy. Commenting on John Locke's political philosophy and its relevance for American Christians today, Bahnsen said:

What would have been abhorrent for Locke is taken for granted in our day, that the majority have the right to vote in a State that will tax people to redistribute their wealth. 

I’m just taking one example of many: Locke would have thought that as abhorrent. That he didn’t, you see, take account of that is because Lock could count on the general Christian or protestant morality of England in his day. It’s just -- nobody would ever think that the [democratic] State could be used as an indirect way of thievery. You know, the majority getting in so that they could put their hands into the pockets of all the citizens to take their money. But we have now moved into a day where we have to reexamine much of what Locke had to say because the kind of freedom that he granted to the State, and the kind of freedom he granted to citizens in forming their State, assumed something of which we no longer have.

 

Now I’m not saying we should not have that view of the State.

 

What I’m saying is, well, to take another example: If you try to take Locke’s view of the democratic State to Somalia today, hey, good luck! -- Because Somalia is a warlord society. It does not have a Christian ethic, a Christian worldview--I mean, even in the broadest perspective. And, I would argue that worldviews hang together. Locke’s was not a perfect one by any means, but the only reason his political theory is so good is because it operated within a general Christian worldview. And he could assume that in a general sense, in terms of the values of his fellow citizens. But when you don’t have that--when you have ethical anarchy--then having the State being run by the majority may not prove to be the State that brings welfare to the people.

 

So now I’m going to say something that is going to be rather controversial, and I want you to reflect on it:

 

My sympathies are Puritan. My sympathies are Presbyterian. They are so much so that I criticize Cromwell, the Puritan general, because he re-introduced basically another monarchy that tyrannized the people toward the end of the puritan revolution. So you know where my sympathies are.

 

However, in terms of political theory, I would have to say, I would rather have a King that enforces the Law of God, than a majority that kills babies. Now the reason I’m saying this is because I have a great respect for Locke and what he has bequeathed to us, but don’t ever think that the form and administration of the State is more important than the morality of the State.

 

And so, I don’t want a king because I know that men tend to absolutize their power and tyrannize others. I want a parliamentary or a congressional or a democratic form of government--like Lock would have said, I want separation of powers. I don’t want concentration of power. I really prefer that. But that is a subordinate preference. I would prefer a King who did the righteous thing to a Congress that will not do righteousness.1 

1.  Greg Bahnsen, History of Western Philosophy: Renaissance & Enlightenment [Lectures on British Empiricism]. Bahnsen's lectures on philosophy are available together at http://www.cmfnow.com/historyofphilosophyinaflash.aspx  

Individual lectures from his series on Renaissance & Enlightenment can be found here:  http://www.cmfnow.com/histofwesternphilrenaissanceandenlight.aspx

Wisdom prepares a feast

Commenting on Proverbs 9:1-6, Saint Ambrose of Milan teaches an interesting connection between the feast which "Wisdom" prepares in her house and the feast which the Church of Christ prepares in her house:

You wish to eat, you wish to drink. Come to the feast of Wisdom which invites all men by a great proclamation, saying: 'Come, eat my bread and drink my wine that I have mingled.' Do not fear that in the Feast of the Church you will lack either pleasant perfumes, or agreeable food, or varied drink, or fitting servants. There you will gather myrrh, that is to say, the burial of Christ, in such a way that, buried with Him by Baptism, you also will arise from the dead as He Himself is arisen. There you will eat the bread that strengthens the heart of man, you will drink the wine so that you may grow to the full stature of Christ.1

1.  Jean Danielou, S.J., The Bible and the Liturgy [Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press; reprint 2011] p. 158